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Notes 
REHABILITATING BIOETHICS: 
RECONTEXTUALIZING IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION OUTSIDE CONTRACTUAL 
AUTONOMY 
OLIVIA LIN 
INTRODUCTION 
As in vitro fertilization (IVF) and other reproductive 
technologies become increasingly prevalent, the legal and bioethical 
issues that inevitably accompany these new technologies are 
outpacing both legislative and judicial responses.1 Thus far, 
legislatures hesitant to address the ethical uncertainties in IVF have 
been slow to adopt clear guidelines regarding the disposition of the 
frozen preembryos2 that remain after an IVF procedure.3 As a result, 
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 1. See F. Barrett Faulkner, Note, Applying Old Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests 
of Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 27 (2003): 
In most states, the legislature has been slow in resolving the conflicts between old 
laws and new reproductive technologies. Courts in many of these states have 
attempted to find a set of rules for determining parentage of children born through 
new technology, using statutes adopted at a time when legislatures could not have 
anticipated such births. 
 2. Although the relevant case law uses the terms “pre-zygote” and “preembryo” 
interchangeably, John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal 
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 CAL. L. REV. 939, 952 n.45 (1986), barring direct 
quotation, this Note will rely solely on the term “preembryo.” A preembryo is the term for a 
zygote, or fertilized egg, that has not been implanted (for development into the embryo proper) 
into the uterus; the preembryo is the category for the first cell stage at which zygotes may be 
cryopreserved in the IVF process. Susan L. Crockin, “What Is an Embryo?”: A Legal 
Perspective, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1178–80 (2004). 
 3. There is a dearth of legislation regarding the disposition of frozen preembryos. As of 
this writing, only three states have enacted relevant legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 
(West 1997) (“A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written 
agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and 
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen 
circumstance.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (West 2000) (providing that the preembryo must 
be considered a “juridical person”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2001) (“No preembryo 
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courts have been left to themselves to determine the best response 
when a divorce subsequent to IVF generates dispute over the 
disposition of remaining preembryos,4 when one of the parties to IVF 
argues against the validity of signed consent forms,5 or when public 
policy appears to argue against forcing donors to become parents 
against their will.6 The disposition of frozen embryos implicates a 
variety of legal issues, and any fruitful consideration of these issues 
must operate alongside an analysis of contemporary bioethics. This 
Note proposes that the bioethical concerns intrinsic to IVF 
cryopreservation of preembryos militate against a traditional contract 
approach that turns on personal autonomy and freedom of contract. 
Drawing upon contemporary bioethics and theological discourse, 
this Note suggests that the unique relationships resulting from the 
IVF process preclude the use of classical, contractual frameworks 
privileging individual autonomy. An alternative, teleological 
framework can recontextualize IVF within contract theory in a 
manner that better accounts for the intersection of IVF and the 
bioethical concerns that IVF necessarily implicates. 
Under contemporary case law, contracts are often interpreted 
with an eye toward preserving individual autonomy.7 By contrast, a 
teleological approach to contracts would favor for enforcement those 
contracts that successfully achieved the original telos, or purpose, 
underlying the given contract: in the case of IVF procedures, the 
development of a parent-child relationship. Ultimately, this Note 
argues that this underlying purpose radically informs the 
interpretation of contracts concerning preembryo disposition. Given 
this new hermeneutic, contract interpretation would be more likely to 
produce results consistent with both the intent of the parties at the 
time that the contract was formed and the principles of bioethics. 
Part I of this Note describes the IVF procedure, focusing on 
those elements at the center of contemporary legal battles. In large 
part, the legal disputes concern the disposition of the cryopreserved 
preembryos that remain after the conclusion of the IVF process. In 
 
shall be maintained ex utero in the noncryo-preserved state beyond 14 days post-fertilization 
development.”). 
 4. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 5. E.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 
1998); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 6. E.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 7. See infra notes 101–13 and accompanying text. 
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discussing these foundational issues, Part I also examines how the 
confusion surrounding the legal and ontological status of preembryos 
influences IVF litigation. 
Subsequently, Part II examines the relevant case law to 
demonstrate the existing disconnect between contemporary bioethical 
issues and legal responses. Although only five state courts have ruled 
on the disposition of cryopreserved embryos, the resulting opinions 
illustrate the complex questions that often arise in such cases: 
whether preembryos are persons, property, or neither; which party 
should have decisional authority over the remaining preembryos; 
whether written consent forms pertaining to disposition should be 
enforced; the extent to which public policy issues should inform the 
legal discourse concerning IVF; and, finally, the degree to which party 
intent should be a factor in contract interpretation. Although the 
state courts reached different conclusions regarding preembryo 
disposition, for the most part their discourse framed the contractual 
analysis regarding IVF contract agreements around the language of 
individual autonomy prevalent in contemporary contract theory. 
After exploring the relevant legal concerns, Part III navigates the 
current theological and bioethical terrain as it pertains to IVF; in 
particular, this discussion considers the different constructs of 
personhood and parental relationships at issue in new reproductive 
technologies. Currently, a high premium on individual autonomy 
generates a theory of contract that may neglect to account for the 
relationships central to the IVF process. As an alternative, this Note 
contends that both theological and bioethical perspectives support a 
teleological framework for IVF litigation that does not require 
dismissing either individual autonomy or communitarian values. This 
teleological perspective would allow for the implementation of new 
policies, including embryo adoption and legislated limits on embryo 
cryopreservation. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
With the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first child conceived 
outside a woman’s body,8 the reproductive landscape changed 
dramatically. Conventional notions of conception and childbirth gave 
way to the possibility of long-term gamete and embryo 
 
 8. Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 101, 106 (2003). 
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cryopreservation, surrogate motherhood, and even posthumous 
reproduction.9 In particular, the development of reproductive 
technologies such as IVF provided a solution for infertile couples who 
sought a “genetic, biological connection” with their children.10 
Although society’s premium on genetically related offspring may 
prompt criticism from academics,11 reproductive procedures such as 
IVF are increasingly popular and, each year, Americans spend over 
one billion dollars on medical and surgical fertility procedures.12 At 
the same time, the science underlying these procedures is gradually 
eroding traditional ways of understanding when life begins,13 
personality develops,14 and the parent-child bond forms.15 
 
 9. See id. at 107 (“[T]he presumed biological anchors through which families were once 
understood are being replaced with a variety of alternative truths about human reproduction.”). 
 10. Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating 
Decisional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 937 (1999). 
 11. Leslie Bender, Professor of Law and Women’s Studies at Syracuse University, argues 
that a construction of parenthood based purely on a genetic relationship (“genetic 
essentialism”) ignores the formative, nonbiological aspects of human personality. See Leslie 
Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & 
Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2003) (“[Genetic essentialism] ignores the ways our cells 
and environments interrelate, the ways our physiological system functions as a whole organism, 
and the ways our minds and hearts affect our being.”). 
 12. Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes 
over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1998). 
 13. The tension in determining when life begins is most evident in abortion debates. See, 
e.g., Donald Hope, The Hand as Emblem of Human Identity: A Solution to the Abortion 
Controversy Based on Science and Reason, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205, 206 (2001) (“The pro-choice 
arguments are most persuasive when referring to the early, embryonic, stages of development, 
but are much less convincing when applied to fetal life. Conversely, pro-life reasoning applies 
most forcefully to fetuses, but runs into serious difficulty when applied to embryonic life.”). 
 14. See id. at 207: 
While some claim that human individuality begins at conception, the scientific facts 
do not support this assertion . . . . After the fertilized egg’s first divisions, there is the 
possibility of the splitting of one embryo into two or more separate individuals. There 
is also the possibility of the merging of two distinct embryos with different genotypes 
into one individual. These phenomena call into question the entire notion of 
individuality at this early cellular level of development. 
(footnote omitted). 
 15. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 107 (“As a result of [developments in reproductive 
technologies], biological maternity has been separated into two different aspects (gestational 
and genetic) . . . and the presumed biological anchors through which families were once 
understood are being replaced with a variety of alternative truths about human reproduction.”). 
Embryo adoption, one of the newest developments in family law, further illustrates the 
potential for evolution in the parent-child relationship. See Olga Batsedis, Note, Embryo 
Adoption: A Science Fiction or an Alternative to Traditional Adoption?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 565, 
572 (2003) (“Through embryo adoption, infertile couples can now experience the miracle of 
birth as well as the growth process inside the mother’s womb [of a genetically unrelated 
child].”). 
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The science of the IVF procedure begins when doctors use 
hormonal stimulation to cause a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple 
eggs.16 Subsequently, these eggs are removed to a petri dish, where 
they are fertilized with sperm.17 Fertilization results in preembryos, 
which are then transferred to the uterus through a cervical catheter.18 
Despite the awkwardness of the term “preembryo,” the label is 
accurate because, at this point, the collection of cells constituting the 
preembryo has not undergone sufficient differentiation to form what 
will later be termed the embryo.19 To result in a successful pregnancy, 
the preembryo must be implanted into the uterine lining.20 Although 
it is customary for a doctor to retrieve ten or more eggs during the 
process of hormone stimulation, no more than three or four 
preembryos are transferred to a uterus at any given time because of 
the increased risk of multiple pregnancies.21 Much of the legal 
controversy, then, centers around the legal and ontological status of 
the preembryos remaining after implantation. Through 
cryopreservation, a technique that allows for the indefinite 
preservation of preembryos in liquid nitrogen, remaining preembryos 
can be set aside for subsequent implantation attempts, disposal, or 
research.22 If clinics used hormonal stimulation to retrieve only the 
number of eggs intended for implantation, IVF would be somewhat 
less controversial. However, this method seems unlikely; because 
most couples must undergo several IVF cycles before a successful 
pregnancy, cryopreservation presents an economically efficient means 
of avoiding subsequent, costly ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval.23  
 
 16. Walter, supra note 10, at 938. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Am. Fertility Soc’y Ethics Comm., Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive 
Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 15S, 31S–32S (1990): 
[T]he first cellular differentiation of the new generation [of cells] relates to 
physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the 
embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing 
entity up to this point as a preembryo, rather than an embryo.  
(emphasis omitted) (quoted in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992)). 
 20. Walter, supra note 10, at 938. 
 21. Karissa Hostrup Windsor, Note, Disposition of Cryopreserved Preembryos After 
Divorce, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2003). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 2001) (“Cryopreservation of unused 
preembryos reduces, and may eliminate, the need for further ovarian stimulation and egg 
retrieval, thereby reducing the medical risks and costs associated with both the hormone 
regimen and the surgical removal of egg cells from the woman’s body.”); Suchitra Jittaun 
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The disposition of unused preembryos does not occur wholly 
without guidance. IVF clinics that offer to use cryopreserved 
preembryos for later implantations often enter into formal, written 
agreements with infertile couples.24 Typically, these written 
agreements offer couples several options with regard to the 
disposition of any remaining preembryos.25 Most often, these options 
include reserving the preserved preembryos for future implantation, 
destruction of the preembryos, donation to a different couple, or 
donation to the IVF clinic for research purposes.26 Clinic agreements 
may also provide that the death of a party, divorce, refusal to remain 
in an IVF program, or termination of an agreement will trigger a 
given option.27 Although these contractual constructs appear 
relatively transparent, substantial legal confusion remains because of 
IVF’s implications for several charged bioethical issues.28 
II.  STATE SUPREME COURT CASE LAW  
RELATING TO IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
Although relevant case law is sparse, the five cases discussed in 
this Part illustrate the diversity of judicial responses to the questions 
surrounding the disposition of remaining cryopreserved preembryos. 
The discussion of these cases emphasizes each state court’s approach 
to the question of IVF contract interpretation.29 Although other 
 
Satpathi, Comment, Gliding over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Responsibility in the New 
Reproductive Era; Why Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 
58 (1999) (“IVF is a costly and draining procedure. The cost of the numerous rounds usually 
required in order to achieve a successful pregnancy can be upwards of $40,000.”). 
 24. Walter, supra note 10, at 938. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Michael T. Morley et al., Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in 
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 172 (2003) (“Courts have consistently refused to 
enforce contracts . . . that would result in one party becoming a parent against his or her will.”). 
 29. Because state courts have largely viewed the problem of preembryo disposition 
through a contractual lens, this Note does not consider an earlier case, York v. Jones, 717 F. 
Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), which is the sole case to frame the relationship between the parties 
to an IVF agreement and their preembryos as a property issue. In that case, the court found: 
“[T]he inference to be drawn from these provisions of the Cryopreservation Agreement is that 
the defendants fully recognize plaintiffs’ property rights in the pre-zygote and have limited their 
rights as bailee to exercise dominion and control over the pre-zygote.” Id. at 426–27. 
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factors, such as the right to privacy30 and public policy 
considerations,31 often figured in the courts’ decisionmaking 
processes, the courts generally focused on contract interpretation. For 
that reason, the balance of this Note focuses on this area of law. 
A. Davis v. Davis: A Constitutional Inquiry  
Although by 1992 IVF was already prominent in the United 
States, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was the first to address the 
contractual questions concerning the disposition of frozen 
preembryos.32 The court’s landmark case, Davis v. Davis,33 illustrates 
the difficulties generated when courts grapple with the legal status of 
preembryos in concert with the often complex relationships among 
parties to IVF.34 In Davis, the court determined custody of frozen 
preembryos from a married couple’s IVF procedure after the couple 
had divorced. The couple involved, Mary Sue Davis and her ex-
husband Junior Lewis Davis, had cryopreserved seven preembryos 
after six unsuccessful attempts at IVF.35 Two facts were central to the 
Davis court’s analysis: first, when signing up for the IVF procedure, 
the Davises had not executed a written agreement specifying what 
should be done with the remaining preembryos after the 
cryopreservation process;36 second, no Tennessee statute governing 
such disposition had existed at the time, and none had been enacted 
since.37 As a result of this ambiguous legal landscape, the seven 
 
 30. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992) (“Here, the specific individual 
freedom in dispute is the right to procreate. . . . We hold that the right of procreation is a vital 
part of an individual’s right to privacy.”). 
 31. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (“We derive from existing State 
laws and judicial precedent a public policy in this Commonwealth that individuals shall not be 
compelled to enter into intimate family relationships, and that the law shall not be used as a 
mechanism for forcing such relationships when they are not desired.”). 
 32. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (“Despite the fact that over 5,000 IVF babies have been 
born in this country and the fact that some 20,000 or more ‘frozen embryos’ remain in storage, 
there are apparently very few other litigated cases involving the disputed disposition of 
untransferred ‘frozen embryos’ . . . .”). 
 33. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 34. See id. at 594 (“One of the fundamental issues the inquiry poses is whether the 
preembryos in this case should be considered ‘persons’ or ‘property’ in the contemplation of the 
law.”). 
 35. Id. at 589, 591. 
 36. Id. at 590. 
 37. Id. 
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unused preembryos became the sole subject of legal dispute in an 
otherwise uncomplicated divorce proceeding.38 
In an opinion awarding custody of the preembryos to Junior 
Davis,39 the court delineated various theories by which disposition 
could be settled, all deriving from disparate views concerning the 
nature of preembryos (i.e., whether a preembryo should be allocated 
“person” or “property” status) or the degree to which the personal 
autonomy of either party to the IVF procedure should be 
considered.40 The court considered several legal theories; one theory 
would have required that gamete providers use all preembryos 
obtained during IVF, whereas another theory would have required 
that any remaining preembryos be discarded.41 Still another theory 
would have given female gamete providers control over the 
preembryos in all cases because of females’ “greater physical and 
emotional contribution to the IVF process.”42 Alternatively, the court 
considered two “implied contract” theories: one inferring that 
participation in IVF granted disposition authority to the IVF clinic, 
and one inferring that both parties to IVF had made an “irrevocable 
commitment to reproduction,” and that, therefore, any remaining 
preembryos must be transferred either to the female provider or to a 
viable third party.43 
Ultimately, rejecting the “personhood” of the preembryo,44 the 
Davis court adopted a middle-of-the-road approach regarding the 
status of preembryos and personal autonomy.45 First, the court 
concluded that the preembryos were “not, strictly speaking, either 
 
 38. Id. at 592. 
 39. Id. at 604. 
 40. See id. at 590 (“[M]edical-legal scholars and ethicists have proposed various models for 
the disposition of ‘frozen embryos’ when unanticipated contingencies arise, such as divorce, 
death of one or both of the parties, financial reversals, or simple disenchantment with the IVF 
process.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 590–91. 
 44. Id. at 594–97. 
 45. See id. at 591:  
As appealing as [the possibility of adopting a bright-line test] might seem, we 
conclude that given the relevant principles of constitutional law, the existing public 
policy of Tennessee with regard to unborn life, the current state of scientific 
knowledge giving rise to the emerging reproductive technologies, and the ethical 
considerations that have developed in response to that scientific knowledge, there can 
be no easy answer to the question we now face. 
(emphasis added). 
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‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occup[ied] an interim category that 
entitle[d] them to special respect because of their potential for human 
life.”46 Second, in weighing the right to procreative autonomy,47 the 
court focused on whether “the parties [would] become parents” and 
concluded that “the answer to this dilemma turn[ed] on the parties’ 
exercise of their constitutional right to privacy.”48 Significantly, noting 
that a right to privacy, or personal autonomy, “[was] deeply 
embedded in the Tennessee Constitution,”49 the court concluded that 
the decisionmaking authority remains with the gamete providers 
rather than with the court or the IVF clinic, “at least to the extent that 
the providers’ decisions had an impact upon their individual 
reproductive status.”50 Ultimately, the Davis court held that Junior’s 
interest in avoiding parenthood outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in 
donating the embryos.51 Although the Davis court used a balancing 
test in determining the disposition of the remaining preembryos, the 
court suggested that an agreement pertaining to the disposition of 
remaining preembryos in the event of unforeseen events “should be 
presumed valid and should be enforced.”52 
B. Kass v. Kass: Written Agreements Enforced 
In 1998, six years after the Davis decision, the New York Court 
of Appeals examined the question of preembryo disposition in Kass 
v. Kass.53 There, prior to IVF procedures, Maureen and Steve Kass 
signed consent forms detailing what should be done with the 
remaining preembryos.54 After the couple divorced, Maureen sought 
 
 46. Id. at 597. 
 47. “[T]he right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal 
significance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.” Id. at 601. 
 48. Id. at 598. 
 49. Id. at 599. 
 50. Id. at 602. 
 51. Id. at 604. After the lower court decisions, Mary Sue decided against using the 
preembryos herself but, rather, sought the right to donate them to another couple. Id. at 590. 
 52. Id. at 597. 
 53. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 54. In relevant part, the consent forms indicated: 
We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our frozen pre-
zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose 
without the written consent of both of us . . . . In the event of divorce, we understand 
that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property 
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 176. The Kasses also signed a “Statement of Disposition” that indicated in relevant part: 
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custody of five cryopreserved preembryos, whereas her ex-husband 
argued that the couple had explicitly consented to donate the 
preembryos to the IVF program for research purposes.55 In analyzing 
the relevant consent forms,56 the Kass court followed Davis dicta and 
held that the prior written agreement should be enforced: 
“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding 
disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid 
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”57 
Unlike the Davis court, which devoted a substantial portion of its 
opinion to the question of the legal (and ontological) status of the 
preembryo, the Kass court did not broach that question, observing 
that preembryos are not constitutionally recognized as “persons.”58 
The court further noted that the disposition of preembryos “does not 
implicate a woman’s right of privacy or bodily integrity in the area of 
reproductive choice.”59 Because the Kasses had signed consent forms 
regarding preembryo disposition, the Kass court was able to sidestep 
the larger ontological issues and focus on how to allocate the 
authority over disposition.60 
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that the written 
consent forms signed by the Kasses required that the preembryos be 
donated to the IVF program for research.61 In reaching that 
conclusion, the court not only encouraged future IVF parties to 
“think through possible contingencies and carefully specify their 
wishes [regarding preembryo disposition] in writing,”62 but also 
framed the importance of the contract between the IVF clinic and the 
 
In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a 
decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes . . . : 
  . . . 
  . . . Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological 
studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as 
determined by the IVF Program . . . .  
Id. at 176–77. 
 55. Id. at 177. 
 56. See supra note 54. 
 57. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
 58. Id. at 179 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 181. 
 62. Id. at 180. 
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Kasses as an expression of joint intent.63 In affirming the 
enforceability of the written consent forms, the Kass decision 
illustrates the effect of giving primacy to the notion of freedom of 
contract.64 
C. A.Z. v. B.Z.: Written Agreements Not Enforced 
Highlighting the diverse approaches within the relevant case law, 
in the 2000 decision A.Z. v. B.Z.,65 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts refused to enforce a consent form signed by an IVF 
clinic and the parties to an IVF procedure.66 As in prior cases, the 
couple involved had separated subsequent to IVF treatments that had 
produced cryopreserved embryos.67 Moreover, as with the Kasses, the 
couple had signed a consent form (required by the clinic) providing 
that, in the event of separation, the wife would retain control of the 
preembryos for her future implantation.68 Following the lead of the 
Kass court, the A.Z. court did not discuss the status of the preembryo; 
rather, the opinion turned on issues of freedom of contract and public 
policy.69 
Despite acknowledging that the consent forms contained legal 
ambiguities,70 the court ultimately concluded that, “even had the 
husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement 
 
 63. See id. at 181 (“[T]he informed consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest 
their mutual intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for research 
to the IVF program.” (emphases added)). 
 64. See id. at 182 (“These parties having clearly manifested their intention, the law will 
honor it.”). 
 65. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 66. Id. at 1059. 
 67. Id. at 1053. 
 68. Id. at 1054. A.Z. v. B.Z. has the distinction of being the first reported case to deal with a 
contract purporting to give any remaining preembryos to one of the donors for future 
implantation. Id. at 1056. 
 69. See id. at 1058 (“It is well-established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate 
public policy.”). 
 70. The consent form contained the undefined phrase “[s]hould we become separated.” Id. 
at 1057. Because the custody dispute arose in the context of a divorce, not a separation, the A.Z. 
court ultimately could not conclude that the consent form was intended to govern in the 
particular circumstances. Id. Moreover, the court held that the consent form could not represent 
the husband’s “true intention” regarding preembryo disposition because, when he signed the 
consent form, it was still blank; only after he signed did the wife fill in the blank to reserve the 
embryos for her own implantation. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that the consent form 
was “legally insufficient in several important respects” and did not reach the “minimum level of 
completeness” required for enforcement. Id. 
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between themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen 
preembryos,” public policy, at times, must trump the freedom of 
contract.71 The public policy value given priority was society’s 
reluctance to compel donors to become genetic parents against their 
will.72 According to the A.Z. court, this policy derived from the 
principle that “respect for liberty and privacy” required that an 
individual have the freedom to decide whether to enter into a family 
relationship.73  
D. J.B. v. M.B.: Diminishing the Role of Contract 
In August 2001, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided J.B. v. 
M.B.,74 which concerned the enforceability of a signed consent form 
stipulating that unused preembryos would be donated to the IVF 
clinic in the event of divorce, unless the court ordering the divorce 
specified some other disposition.75 As in A.Z., J.B and M.B. signed a 
consent form prior to their IVF procedure,76 but this couple 
successfully conceived a daughter, who was born shortly before the 
couple separated.77 When J.B. filed a divorce complaint in which she 
sought a court order to have the eight remaining frozen embryos 
discarded, M.B. counterclaimed, seeking to compel J.B. to allow the 
donation of the preembryos to another couple.78 
Noteworthy in the court’s contractual analysis was its focus on 
public policy issues; the court ultimately suggested that the policy of 
protecting individuals from unwanted family responsibilities could 
supersede the enforcement of a contract.79 After determining that it 
could enforce the court order clause in the consent form, the J.B. 
court chose to use the same balancing of interests approach taken in 
 
 71. Id. at 1057–58. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1059. 
 74. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 75. Id. at 710. In relevant part, the consent form stated: “The control and disposition of the 
embryos belongs to the Patient and her Partner. . . . I, J.B. (patient), and M.B. (partner), agree 
that all control, direction, and ownership of our tissues will be relinquished to the IVF Program 
under . . . [a] dissolution of our marriage by court order . . . .” Id. 
 76. Id. at 709–10. 
 77. Id. at 710. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 719 (“The public policy concerns that underlie limitations on contracts 
involving family relationships are protected by permitting either party to object at a later date to 
provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that that party no longer accepts.”). 
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Davis.80 Ultimately, the court held that prohibiting M.B. from 
donating the preembryos would neither deny nor diminish his right to 
procreate.81 By contrast, authorizing donation would violate J.B.’s 
right not to procreate, even though she would not be raising the 
prospective child herself.82 
The J.B. opinion attempted to outline some considerations for 
future consent agreements, noting that they “should be written in 
plain language,” that parties should have the opportunity to review 
the terms with a clinic representative prior to execution, and that, as a 
general principle of contract law, parties should not sign blank 
agreements.83 However, adding greatly to the confusion of the 
relevant case law, the court opined that it would enforce such 
contracts only if both parties had the right to change their minds.84 
This final caveat diminishes the authoritative weight of IVF contracts. 
E. Litowitz v. Litowitz: Enforcing Contracts as Emblematic of Party 
Intent 
Most recently, in Litowitz v. Litowitz,85 the Washington Supreme 
Court enforced an IVF cryopreservation contract stipulating that, if a 
husband and wife could not reach a mutual agreement regarding 
preembryo disposition, the couple would submit the question to the 
court.86 The court enforced the Litowitz contract, in which the parties 
agreed to abide by the court’s instructions if they could not reach a 
consensus concerning the disposition of the preembryos.87 David 
Litowitz wanted to put the remaining preembryos up for adoption, 
whereas Becky Litowitz wished to implant the preembryos in a 
surrogate mother and subsequently raise the resulting children as her 
own.88 
As stipulated by the contract, because the couple disagreed on 
the proper disposition of the frozen preembryos, the court took the 
 
 80. Id. at 716; see supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
 81. Davis, 783 A.2d at 717. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 719. 
 84. See id. (“[T]he better rule . . . is to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro 
fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about 
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos.”). 
 85. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 86. Id. at 270–71. 
 87. Id. at 271. 
 88. Id. 
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responsibility of providing instructions regarding the disposition.89 In 
reaching its conclusion regarding the contractual issues, the Litowitz 
court focused on the parties’ intent to thaw the preembryos;90 the 
contract required that the remaining preembryos be “thawed but not 
allowed to undergo further development” if the preembryos 
remained in cryopreservation for more than five years.91 
Although only David Litowitz was a gamete provider, the court 
found that “he ha[d] no greater contractual right to the eggs” than 
Becky Litowitz, the intended mother.92 Despite this acknowledgment 
of maternal and paternal rights, the Litowitz court sidestepped a 
more precise determination of the ontological status of the contested 
preembyros, declaring that the question of whether the preembryos 
constituted children was “not a logical or relevant inquiry.”93 The 
Supreme Court later denied Becky Litowitz’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari, perpetuating the legal confusion surrounding 
cryopreserved preembryos. 94 
III.  A TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO IVF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION  
As the relevant case law demonstrates,95 there is little analytical 
intersection between the dominant legal theories underlying 
preembryo disposition and the bioethical theories concerning 
personhood and personal autonomy.96 Although it may seem intuitive 
that the legal issues raised by assisted reproductive technologies 
necessarily implicate the vocabulary of bioethics,97 the courts have 
 
 89. Id. at 268. 
 90. See id. (“Contract interpretation must be based on the intent of the parties as reflected 
in their agreement.”). 
 91. Id. at 264. 
 92. Id. at 268. 
 93. Id. at 269. 
 94. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003). 
 95. See supra Part II. 
 96. The question of control is at the center of several bioethical debates, including 
embryonic stem cell research and the destruction of cryopreserved preembryos. However, the 
two debates often elicit dissimilar popular reactions. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 108 (“[I]n the 
main, embryos produced in the context of infertility treatment have not engendered the sort of 
intense controversy about the status and rights of the embryo that has surrounded discussion of 
therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cell research.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 11, at 6 (“For the last two decades, our judicial system has 
trailed woefully behind the complex bioethical dilemmas that accompany the rapid advances in 
biotechnology, biomedicine, and assisted reproductive technologies.”); John A. Robertson, 
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moved toward an analytical bifurcation of the two issues. Indeed, the 
Litowitz court declared that the status of the preembryo was not even 
a “logical or relevant inquiry.”98 Other courts have avoided bioethical 
issues entirely. For people who continue to feel that the legal 
questions surrounding IVF cryopreservation and other assisted 
reproductive technologies cannot avoid a dialogue with bioethics,99 
the current legal frameworks are untenable. 
This Part illustrates that it is imperative for contemporary 
bioethics to inform the legal dialogue surrounding IVF 
cryopreservation. A legal response that relies primarily upon classical, 
autonomy-oriented contract law frameworks100 critically ignores the 
unique bioethical concerns implicated by the IVF process. However, 
a wholesale rejection of the contractual framework is unnecessary. 
Rather, contemporary scholars in both bioethical and theological 
discourse find analytical benefits in an alternative, teleological 
approach to contractual interpretation. This teleological approach 
interprets the IVF process through its purpose of developing a 
 
“Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1729, 1737 (2003) (“Bioethics concerns the ethics, norms, and laws that arise out of medical 
practice and innovation and often involves questions that involve the extension or creation of 
life.”). 
 98. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 269. 
 99. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, Salvation and Health: Why Medicine Needs the Church, in 
SUFFERING PRESENCE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, THE MENTALLY 
HANDICAPPED, AND THE CHURCH 63, 72 (1986): 
[W]e are currently trying to do the impossible—namely, “build a civilization with an 
agreed civil tradition and [in] the absence of a moral consensus.” This makes the 
practice of medicine even more morally challenging, since it is by no means clear how 
one can sustain a non-arbitrary medicine in a genuinely morally pluralistic society.  
(quoting Paul Ramsey, The Nature of Medical Ethics, in THE TEACHING OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
14, 15 (Robert M. Veatch et al. eds., 1973) (alteration in original)); Oliver O’Donovan, Again: 
Who Is a Person?, in ABORTION AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE 125 (J.H. Channer ed., 
1985) (discussing the multifarious bioethical issues arising from the newest reproductive 
technologies). 
 100. See Chad McCracken, Note, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
719, 720–21 (1999) (“[C]ontract law as classically conceived was both corollary to and bulwark 
of liberal individualism.”); id. at 730 (noting that in contract law, the “actual, subjective choice 
of the individual” is viewed as “crucial for autonomy and thus deserving of protection”). 
Although not represented in the current debates over the disposition of cryopreserved 
preembryos, some scholars suggest that legal developments such as the doctrines of 
unconscionability and promissory estoppel evidence the movement of contract law away from 
classical ties to autonomy. See, e.g., Julian S. Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The 
Relevance of Contract Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 605 (2003) 
(“Unconscionability is a fairly modern doctrinal development in contract law, typifying contract 
law’s shift away from a classical theory of contracts based on freedom of contract and autonomy 
rationales.”). 
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parent-child relationship. Ultimately, this approach points toward 
concrete, alternative policies. 
A. Traditional Contract Theory and the Premium on Personal 
Autonomy 
The contractual interpretation driving the most recent state court 
rulings101 places a premium on an issue of paramount importance to 
bioethicists: personal autonomy. For both contract law and 
reproductive bioethics, a critical concern is whether there is a moral 
or ontological imperative to protect individual autonomy.102 Whereas 
the bioethical debate revolves around the extent to which individuals 
can or should control the reproductive process,103 contract law, at its 
core, involves the enforceability of legal restraints on personal 
autonomy.104 The dominant framework for contractual interpretation 
turns on the intent of the parties.105 Not surprisingly, this emphasis on 
individual choice places a “virtual veto power” in the hands of parties 
 
 101. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 108 (“For the most part, courts, entertaining disputes about 
frozen embryos, have relied on contractual agreements to resolve such disputes, or in the 
absence of such agreements, on the comparative interests of the parties.” (footnote omitted)). 
 102. See Bernadette Tobin, Did You Think About Buying Her a Cat? Some Reflections on 
the Concept of Autonomy, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 417, 418 (1995) (observing that, 
in the bioethical debate over euthanasia, some commentators “believe that the capacity to live 
autonomously is the crucial mark of moral maturity and . . . believe that respect for the 
autonomous individual signifies respect for that person as a human being”). 
 103. See, e.g., William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon 
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
455, 506 (2001) (“Emphasis upon personal autonomy, freedom of conscience, and the 
importance of the family as the focal point of procreation formed the larger context for 
theological reflection upon the bioethics of reproductive medicine.”); Joseph Fletcher, 
Technological Devices in Medical Care, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 277, 279 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1998) 
(“[M]orally, the heart of the matter [concerning assisted reproductive technologies] is control. 
The question is whether human beings may choose or make the conditions of life, health, and 
death.” (emphasis added)). 
 104. See, e.g., David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of 
Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 58 (2003) (“The principle of ‘freedom of contract’ . . . 
rests on the belief that respect for personal autonomy is a necessary complement to both the 
liberal political state and a free-market economy.”); Jeanne L. Shroeder, Some Realism About 
Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 509 (1996) (“Under traditional liberal analysis, 
in order to further personal autonomy, contract law should be subjective, in that the parties 
should be able freely to bind themselves by contract however they want. Autonomy, however, 
also demands that no one be bound without her consent.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002) (“Contract interpretation 
must be based on the intent of the parties as reflected in their agreement.”). 
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who want to avoid reproduction.106 Although this form of contractual 
interpretation drives the case law, there remains a confusing diversity 
of approaches to enforcing the written agreements: the contract, if 
present, is sometimes enforced,107 sometimes not enforced if public 
policy suggests otherwise,108 or, most strangely, sometimes enforced 
until the point when any given party to the contract reneges 
consent.109  
Although the cases described in Part II reached different 
conclusions regarding preembryo disposition, the individualism 
characterizing the respective courts’ discussions of the IVF 
agreements derives from a subjective or will theory of contract law, 
which proposes that contracts are enforceable only if there has been a 
“meeting of the minds” between the parties.110 In other words, if 
individual autonomy reigns, contractual agreements that do not 
reflect the subjective agreement of the parties are moot.111 When the 
subjective theory of contract, or will theory, is the prevailing lens 
through which the IVF decision is construed, there is no reason for an 
inquiry into either the ontological or teleological worth of frozen 
preembryos.112 
 
 106. See Morley et al., supra note 28, at 174: 
The practical effect of [the current case law] approach is that it gives the individual 
opposed to implantation a virtual veto power, because the zygotes must stay 
cryopreserved until the couple reaches a resolution; this is exactly what happens when 
a court refuses to enforce a contract over the objection of a party seeking to avoid 
reproduction. 
 107. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (“Agreements between progenitors, 
or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid 
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 
(Tenn. 1992) (finding that a written agreement providing for the disposition of cryopreserved 
preembryos in the event of unforeseen circumstances “should be presumed valid and should be 
enforced”). 
 108. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000) (“[E]ven had the husband and the 
wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of 
the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement . . . . [a]s a matter of public 
policy . . . .”). 
 109. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718–19 (N.J. 2001) (holding that the enforceability of an 
agreement depends on either party’s being able to “change his or her mind about disposition”). 
 110. See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a Theory of 
Contract, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 925, 933 (1987) (“[T]he subjective or will theory of contract . . . 
urges that contractual liability be imposed because, and only to the extent that, the individual 
has voluntarily undertaken such liability.”). 
 111. McCracken, supra note 100, at 738. 
 112. See id. at 732 (observing that the will theory of contract would “bar an inquiry into the 
purposes of the contracting parties or the objective worth of the things to be exchanged”). 
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The autonomy-based perspective on contract theory becomes 
complicated in the arena of IVF procedures because of the unique 
bioethical questions that issues of reproduction and family implicate. 
At the outset, however, it is crucial to emphasize that no single 
bioethical critique can productively reach the diversity of 
contemporary bioethical perspectives. This Note therefore focuses on 
those voices in bioethics that seek a balance between personal 
autonomy and communitarian values.113 As a result, perspectives that 
place a higher premium on personal autonomy114 are outside the 
scope of this particular discussion. 
The central bioethical115 issues here concern the extent to which 
individual autonomy exists within familial relationships.116 Much 
contemporary debate over the place of autonomy in family 
relationships surrounds the use of contractual vocabulary—such as 
“rights” terminology—in the concept of family.117 Several recent legal 
developments reflect a trend toward interpreting the family as a 
collection of autonomous, independent individuals; these 
 
 113. See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, Beyond the Harm Principle: From Autonomy to Civic 
Responsibility, in MORAL VALUES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 191, 
195 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1996) (discussing the moral challenges generated by increasingly 
sophisticated biotechnologies and the clash between these moral challenges and society’s 
traditional protection of personal autonomy). 
 114. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1538 (1999) 
(discussing how the extension of the “rights” vocabulary to “matters that previously had been 
addressed through professional morality . . . was seductive to physicians[,]” who found deferring 
to personal autonomy or public adjudication simpler than “reorient[ing] one’s moral compass”); 
Adrienne E. Quinn, Comment, Who Should Make Medical Decisions for Incompetent Adults? A 
Critique of RCW 7.70.065, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 573, 574 (1997) (“Personal autonomy, a 
principle rooted in Western philosophy, has strongly influenced American law and bioethics.”). 
 115. This Note’s emphasis on the bioethical nature of this conversation explains its focus on 
family relationships in specific as opposed to general contractual relationships. In the main, the 
ethical questions stem from the potential of the preembryo to become party to a parent-child 
relationship. 
 116. Professor Janet L. Dolgin suggests that the contemporary discourse on embryonic stem 
cell research is the product of a post-Enlightenment reinterpretation of the family. See Dolgin, 
supra note 8, at 104 (“[The debate about embryonic stem cells] represents . . . a new debate 
about personhood that assumes autonomous individuality even in familial settings.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 117. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 337, 347–48 (2002): 
By the 1960s and 1970s, the values of the marketplace were being applied to, and 
were redefining, the domestic arena. Family members (especially adults within 
families) began to understand themselves as autonomous individuals, free to 
negotiate the terms of their relationships, and as potentially liberated from traditional 
family roles by the possibility of exercising choice at home, as well as at work. 
(first emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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developments include state provisions for no-fault divorce118 and the 
willingness of courts to recognize and enforce prenuptial agreements 
that anticipate the possibility of divorce.119 Likewise, in its family law 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court underwent an analytical shift from 
Griswold v. Connecticut,120 in which Justice Douglas described 
marriage as a “coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,”121 to Eisenstadt 
v. Baird,122 in which Justice Brennan focused on the individual 
autonomy of each spouse, noting, “[T]he marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an 
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup.”123 Notably, although legal scholarship suggests a 
growing protection of adults as autonomous individuals within some 
family contexts,124 the role of autonomy becomes much more 
ambiguous within the parent-child relationship. 
When touching upon legal issues involving parent-child 
relationships, courts are conflicted about how principles of personal 
autonomy should apply to individual family members.125 By way of 
illustration, over the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has 
delivered opinions describing children as autonomous individuals,126 
 
 118. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1996, 2089 (2003) (“[N]o-fault divorce centers on respect for individual autonomy––the ability 
of parties to make decisions about marriage and divorce free from overwhelming state 
control.”). 
 119. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 122 n.139 (“A number of the early decisions recognizing 
prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce justified that step by referring to sociological 
changes in the character of families [including the increasing rate of divorce].”). 
 120. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 121. Id. at 486. 
 122. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 123. Id. at 453. The Court further noted that the right of privacy includes the right of an 
individual, whether married or single, to be free to make autonomous reproductive decisions. 
Id. 
 124. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 123 (observing that the notion of the family is premised on 
“autonomous individuality,” or the concept that family members are “free to negotiate the 
terms of familial relationships and to define their sexual and reproductive lives without 
reference to the constraints of traditional family life”). 
 125. See id. at 124 n.152 (“The still unresolved ideological struggle about family in the 
United States today focuses not on the relationship between adults within families but on the 
dimensions and meaning of the parent-child relationship.”). 
 126. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“Students 
in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.”). 
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unequal dependents,127 or members of an ambiguous interim 
category.128 The extent to which the Court confers autonomy within a 
parent-child relationship is generally dependent on context.129 The 
heightened ambiguity concerning personal autonomy within parent-
child jurisprudence illustrates why circumscribing individual 
autonomy may become necessary when unrestrained choice produces 
unconstructive or even damaging results.130 Therefore, to best 
evaluate the role of autonomy in the interpretation of disposition 
contracts for cryopreserved preembryos, a more contextual 
understanding of the possible parental relationships is necessary. 
B. The Need for a Teleological Approach 
As a foundational matter, proposing a teleological approach for 
contractual interpretation in IVF cases requires discussing the telos of 
the contractual agreement.131 Under this approach, the contractual 
agreement to undergo IVF cannot be understood apart from the 
parties’ ultimate goal of generating some type132 of parent-child 
 
 127. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616–17 (1979) (upholding a state law that allowed 
parents voluntarily to commit children into mental institutions). 
 128. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992) (holding 
that a state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain parental consent as long as an 
adequate judicial bypass procedure is available). 
 129. Questioning the reach of constitutional jurisprudence that presumes autonomous 
individuality in protecting individual rights, Professor Dolgin suggests that family law 
inappropriately applies personal autonomy frameworks to the parent-child relationship. See 
Dolgin, supra note 8, at 405 (“[American constitutional jurisprudence and its presumption of 
autonomous individuality] cannot easily serve groups defined by status [such as children] . . . . 
For such groups, legal protection almost inevitably becomes synonymous with paternalism.”). 
 130. See Merry Jean Chan, Note, The Authorial Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of 
Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1189 (2003) (“Regulating parental rights is necessary to 
prevent certain extreme expressive choices with respect to childbearing or childrearing from 
undercutting the social goal of regenerating society.”). 
 131. See Henry Mather, Searching for the Moral Foundations of Contract Law, 47 AM. J. 
JURIS. 71, 72 (2002) (“[I]f some social institution or activity has such an end, it would seem that 
we should evaluate that institution or activity according to how well it promotes that end.”). 
 132. The complexity of assisted reproductive technologies has generated new constructions 
of parenthood that eclipse a traditional view of parenthood based purely on genetic 
relationship. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring Infertility 
in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 339 (2003) (contrasting genetic 
parenthood with surrogate parenthood, in which a surrogate mother agrees to implantation with 
a fertilized egg provided by either an intended mother or an egg donor); Faulkner, supra note 1, 
at 28 (“With IVF, donors may provide both ova and sperm, so there are potentially four people 
with parental interests: the genetic father (sperm donor), the genetic mother (egg donor), the 
gestational mother, and the husband of the gestational mother.”). 
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relationship.133 Indeed, if the contract privileges the concept of 
individual autonomy rather than the parent-child relationship, it fails 
to reflect accurately the interdependent relationships implicated 
when the contract is enforced.134 Whereas a contractual framework 
oriented around autonomy may prove insufficient given the collective 
and relational objectives at stake, a teleological framework permits 
the desirable predictability of a concrete legal standard while 
supporting the uniquely relational concerns at stake in the IVF 
process.135 The teleological approach, rather than privileging ideals of 
individual autonomy, develops out of natural law theory’s emphasis 
on continuity between morality and the law, focusing on the purpose 
of a given legal structure.136 An examination of the teleology of IVF 
requires engaging the reality of the relationships among the affected 
 
 133. See, e.g., Roger H. Taylor, The Fear of Drawing the Line at Cloning, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 379, 398 (2003) (distinguishing between the teleology of IVF and that of genetic 
cloning by noting that “[t]he purpose of IVF embryos is to create a new human being” whereas 
“the purpose of an embryo cloned for therapeutics is to improve an existing human’s life”); Erik 
W. Johnson, Note, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition Through Contract, 55 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 793, 796 (2003) (“In vitro fertilization has provided patients with a marginal success 
rate, but it is typically the last resort of parents who wish to procreate using their own genetic 
material.”); Satpathi, supra note 23, at 56 (“The paradigm that determines legal parenthood on 
the basis of individual intentions about procreation and parenting, in the context of 
reproductive technology, should recognize, encourage, and reinforce individual choices to 
nurture children.”); Mario Trespalacios, Comment, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable 
Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 827 (1992) (“The main premise of the contract framework 
assumes that the biological donors mutually decided to undergo IVF, thereby entering into a 
contract, either explicitly or implicitly, with each other to create pre-embryos for the purpose of 
implantation, with the ultimate goal of achieving live births.” (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 134. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 
727, 736 (1993) (“By making the autonomous actor and the ‘lone rights-bearer’ our model for 
social thought, we inadvertently disparage and injure those who do not fit the model, ‘the very 
young, the severely ill or disabled, the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them.’” 
(quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 47, 74 (1991))). 
 135. Significantly, although contract law has been viewed as a legal structure that 
commodifies its subjects by treating them as units of exchange, a teleological approach can 
prevent such commodification by highlighting the subjects as ends, not purely as means. See 
Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual 
Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2003) (arguing 
that to allow a court to make its own assessment regarding a couple’s preembryos may devalue 
embryos in ways that contractual enforcement does not). 
 136. See Mather, supra note 131, at 72: 
Natural law theory is teleological. It evaluates a human artifact, human institution, or 
human activity by how well it achieves its proper purpose, its end, its telos . . . . The 
end of medicine is health. The end of shipbuilding is a vessel. The end of strategy is 
victory. 
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parties, thereby altering the legal terrain surrounding IVF contracts.137 
This Section addresses both the bioethical and theological arguments 
that support such a teleological theory of contract. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts that choose to address bioethical 
issues in the context of IVF litigation generally focus on the 
personhood (or lack thereof) of the preembryo.138 The ontological 
personhood of the fetus (and now the embryo or preembryo) has 
been a baseline assumption of many commentators who view casual 
disposition of embryos as morally objectionable.139 The conventional 
perspective on the legal and ethical controversies surrounding 
assisted reproductive technologies or abortion posits the existence of 
two camps: people who view the embryo as a person and people who 
deny the embryo any ontological status.140 People who argue for the 
personhood of a cryopreserved preembryo often do so because 
society traditionally associated personhood with both dignity and the 
conferring of legal rights.141  
 
 137. See Robert J. Araujo, Abortion, Ethics, and the Common Good: Who Are We? What 
Do We Want? How Do We Get There?, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 701, 721 (1993) (“Because we as 
individual humans are also social beings whose existence is grounded in relationships with 
others, the concept of the telos helps us to understand [our ethical goal] by placing it into a 
communal setting.”). 
 138. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (choosing to resolve the dispute 
without discussing whether preembryos are deserving of “special respect” as legal persons); 
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (observing that a fundamental issue in the 
disposition dispute was whether the remaining preembryos should be considered legal 
“persons”). 
 139. See Dolgin, supra note 8, at 118: 
[During and after the nineteenth century,] the ontological status of the fetus was one 
among a wide set of concerns and assertions publicized by abortion opponents. . . . 
Nineteenth-century abortion opponents constructed the notion of the embryo-as-
person, but their agenda was grounded in a vision of traditional family life and gender 
roles.  
 140. See Janet Dolgin, The Ideological Context of the Disability Rights Critique: Where 
Modernity and Tradition Meet, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 343, 355 (2003) (“For abortion opponents, 
assertions about the fetus-as-child have provided the sort of strategic tool that has largely been 
lacking in other contexts involving legal responses to adults’ expanded choices, especially about 
reproductive matters, within family contexts.”). 
 141. See Stephen M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for 
Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Society, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 795 (1998) (“[O]nly human beings . . . 
and institutions that represent human interests[] have ever been eligible for legal personhood 
and therefore legal rights.”). For some commentators, the decision to confer legal rights onto 
“persons” is incontrovertibly linked to the notion that autonomous individuals should have legal 
rights. See id. at 798 (“Like liberty rights, dignity-rights are almost universally claimed to be 
derived from a capacity for autonomy.”). 
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A more cogent, bioethically informed approach to the 
disposition of cryopreserved preembryos could avoid the current legal 
wrangling over personhood.142 In contemporary society, however, the 
vocabulary of “personhood” may no longer carry the same 
resonance.143 Consequently, bioethicists are now challenging the 
adequacy of “personhood” as a useful inquiry for resolving the legal 
complexities generated by assisted reproductive technologies.144 
Contemporary bioethical discourse supports a stronger emphasis on 
teleology. Many ethicists now suggest that the ethical inquiry 
underlying issues such as IVF should depend not on ontological 
questions of personhood but, rather, on whether a given choice 
damages a relationship.145 From this perspective, resolving the 
bioethical tensions surrounding cryopreserved embryos requires not 
ontological postulation, but in-depth examination of the prospective 
relationship that served as the telos for the initial IVF contract.146 
 
 142. See Windsor, supra note 21, at 1007–13 (describing three different approaches to the 
legal status of cryopreserved preembryos: the Person Status/Right-to-Life Approach, the 
Property Status Approach, and the Special Respect Approach). 
 143. See Stanley Hauerwas, Must a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle 
Charlie Is Not Much of a Person but He Is Still My Uncle Charlie, 39 CONN. MED. 815, 817 
(1975): 
[W]e are now in a period when some people no longer think simply because a child is 
born to them they need to regard it as their child. We will not solve this kind of 
dilemma by trying to say what the doctor can and cannot do in such circumstances in 
terms of whether the child can be understood to be a “person” or not. 
 144. See id. at 815–17 (arguing that most moral decisions have less to do with the ontological 
concept of a “person” than with the relationships developed through a given situation); 
O’Donovan, supra note 99, at 127 (suggesting a self-described “existentialist anthropology,” by 
which society does not “confer[]” personhood by treating an object as a person but rather 
“discover[s]” personhood through an object’s relationships with others). 
 145. See Hauerwas, supra note 143, at 816 (“[T]he reason that we do not use one man for 
another or society’s good is not that we violate his ‘person,’ but rather because we have learned 
that it is destructive of the trust between us to do so.”). Professor Roger B. Dworkin rejects the 
notion that individualism and personal autonomy should be the guiding principles of bioethical 
discussions. See Dworkin, supra note 134, at 736: 
The American style of discussing rights is so deviant from that of other western 
democracies that Professor Mary Ann Glendon refers to it as a “dialect” and suggests 
that it “is turning American political discourse into a parody of itself.” Our focus on 
the individual and his rights increases conflict and impedes the search for common 
ground. It ignores responsibility, without which rights become license, and it ignores 
our interdependence. 
(quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 171 (1991)) (footnotes omitted). 
 146. Professor Stanley Hauerwas, a Christian ethicist at Duke Divinity School, suggests that 
the question of whether a fetus is a human person is not the central concern in another visceral 
contemporary debate, abortion. See Hauerwas, supra note 143, at 816: 
[T]he issues surrounding whether an abortion should or should not be done seldom 
turn on the question of the status of the fetus. Rather, they involve why the mother 
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Reframing the IVF debate in the context of teleology—in terms 
of relationships—also prevents an inappropriate “reduction” of the 
preembryo to an object of exchange, or a unit of reproductive success 
or failure.147 Noted bioethicist and law professor Michael Shapiro 
argues that biomedical technologies ought to be evaluated based on 
the likelihood that they will erode “noncontingent bonds.”148 For 
Professor Shapiro, these noncontingent bonds are the affections and 
duties implicit in the typical parent-child relationship.149 
Both traditional and contemporary theology posit a sharp divide 
between the teleology of the sacred and the secular spheres.150 Several 
theologians writing in the early centuries developed notions of 
community through the language of teleology. Writing in the early 
centuries of the Christian tradition, Saint Augustine distinguished the 
“earthly city” from the “city of God” by describing the earthly city as 
one in which the telos of self-love reigned and the individual was 
insulated from the rest of the community, and the city of God as one 
characterized by the love of God and neighbor.151 Later, Thomas 
Aquinas buttressed Augustine’s notion of a common good by framing 
the concept of justice around the “mutuality or reciprocity shared 
among . . . members of society.”152 Notably, for both Augustine and 
Aquinas, respect for the community was not philosophically at odds 
with respect for the individual.153 Rather, as Professor Robert Araujo 
notes: “[P]rotection of the human person in all of his or her dignity 
requires insertion and participation in, not insulation and separation 
from, the community. The community . . . withers when [its members] 
turn within and tend only to their private cares.”154 
 
does not want the pregnancy to continue, the conditions under which the pregnancy 
occurred, [and] the social conditions into which the child would be born. The question 
of whether the fetus is or is not a person is almost a theoretical nicety in relation to 
the kind of questions that most abortion decisions actually involve. 
 147. See Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of Ethics and Law “Catching 
Up” with Technology, 33 IND. L. REV. 17, 119–20 (1999) (describing a form of “reduction” in 
which a person’s value “is ascribed to the single trait or traits in question”). 
 148. Id. at 119. 
 149. See id. (“‘Bonds’ here refers to the sense of duty and feelings of affection we have for 
our children, whatever their traits, and for each other as persons.”). 
 150. Araujo, supra note 137, at 735–36. 
 151. Id. at 736. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 736–37. 
 154. Id. at 741. 
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What these theological perspectives suggest, therefore, is that a 
communitarian framework need not come at the expense of 
individual choice. Adopting a teleological framework to assess IVF 
cryopreservation may prevent courts from falling into the common 
fallacy of viewing autonomy and community as mutually exclusive 
ideals.155 
C. Policy Implications 
The practical effect of applying a teleological framework for 
contract law is the enforcement of those contracts that are 
philosophically consistent with the telos of the foundational IVF 
contract: developing some type of parent-child relationship, biological 
or not. Under that framework, because the telos implicates every 
preembryo, courts would need to reevaluate contract clauses allowing 
for the destruction of remaining preembryos. 
There currently exist several alternatives to preembryo 
destruction that could be incorporated as contractual options, 
including preembryo adoption156 and limitations on the transfer of 
more preembryos than necessary in a given IVF cycle.157 Donating 
embryos for adoption is consistent with the end for which parties 
initially engage in the IVF process: creating a parent-child 
relationship.158 Likewise, limiting the number of preembryos 
transferred for fertilization during the IVF process is consistent with 
IVF’s teleological aim because parties would not be transferring 
several more preembryos than they would be willing to parent. Such 
limits would provide the dual benefits of avoiding the problem of 
remaining preembryos (not all of which, presumably, the IVF parties 
 
 155. See Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive 
Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1218 (1996) 
(“[T]his view that the framework of choice excludes other frameworks is simply wrong, when 
stated as an across-the-board proposition.”). 
 156. See Batsedis, supra note 15, at 569 (“[F]rozen embryos can now be adopted by 
others . . . . [I]f the embryos survive the thawing process, and if the implantation is successful, a 
woman will give birth to a child she adopted as an embryo.”). 
 157. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 624–25 (2003) (observing that some researchers 
have recommended that IVF clinics only transfer one or two preembryos for fertilization 
purposes). 
 158. Significantly, there is no genetic “bias” in preembryo adoption. Rather, the adoptive 
parents retain full legal rights over their adopted children. See Batsedis, supra note 15, at 570 
(noting that Snowflakes, an embryo adoption agency, requires that parties sign a contract 
indicating that no legal ties would remain between the biological parents and their embryo). 
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would want to parent) and reducing the risk of multifetal pregnancy 
as well.159 The approach of limiting the number of transferred 
preembryos is one that can be legislated as well.160 However, fewer 
embryos transferred may mean lower fertility rates, which is 
problematic for clinics.161 That concern notwithstanding, that other 
countries (such as the United Kingdom) have successfully legislated 
such limits on the number of transferred preembryos162 demonstrates 
that practicable alternatives exist that comport with a teleological 
approach. 
CONCLUSION 
With the development of assisted reproductive technologies such 
as in vitro fertilization, human inventiveness opened a Pandora’s box 
of bioethical and legal issues. In particular, profound uncertainty 
exists when a party to IVF subsequently contests the disposition of 
cryopreserved preembryos. Perhaps because these technologies 
implicate some of the most intimate human concerns—reproduction, 
parenting, and marriage—both legislatures and the courts have been 
reluctant to speak explicitly about any resolution of the present 
confusion. The few courts to address the issue of remaining 
preembryos have considered the problem within the typical 
framework of contract interpretation, focusing almost exclusively 
upon the ideal of individual autonomy. Despite agreement on a 
contractual approach to this problem, courts have reached conflicting 
results. Some state courts have argued that written IVF agreements 
should always be enforced,163 other courts have refused to enforce 
agreements against public policy,164 and still other courts have 
 
 159. Because of the risk of multifetal pregnancies generated by current multiple preembryo 
implantations, some scholars suggest a restriction on the number of preembryos transferred for 
fertilization. See, e.g., Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Call 
for New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 275 (2003) (“In IVF, the risk of multifetal 
pregnancy can be reduced by transferring fewer preembryos, but . . . . reducing the number of 
preembryos lowers the chances that pregnancy will occur.”). 
 160. Noah, supra note 157, at 625. 
 161. See Strong, supra note 159, at 275 (“Clinic-specific pregnancy rates are required by law 
to be reported and are published annually. . . . Infertility specialists thus have a personal interest 
in achieving high pregnancy rates.”). 
 162. See Noah, supra note 157, at 625 n.94 (noting that several countries prohibit the 
transfer of more than three embryos, and that the United Kingdom recently lowered its limit to 
two). 
 163. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. See supra Part II.C. 
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indicated that agreements are enforceable only if the parties remain 
in agreement regarding the contract.165 Ultimately, case law is not a 
positive source of guidance on the issue of preembryo disposition. 
This Note aims to illustrate how an honest consideration of the 
bioethical issues at stake in the IVF process can illuminate a more 
productive framework for legal analysis. In particular, the telos of the 
IVF process—the development of a parent-child relationship—
militates against a classical, autonomy-oriented contractual approach. 
This alternative approach, however, does not necessitate falling into 
the typical camps in the debate over reproductive technologies: 
people who view preembryos as persons and people who view 
preembryos as merely collections of cells. Indeed, as bioethicists now 
suggest, attempting to define the ontological status of the preembryo 
may ultimately be a losing cause. Rather than ontology, this Note 
argues for teleology as the guiding bioethical principle to resolve this 
legal debate. 
 
 165. See supra Part II.D. 
